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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
trust would seem to contradict not only Lyon, but also the apparent
intent underlying New York's legislative scheme. This issue was
expressly called to the legislature's attention in 1963 by the Tempo-
rary State Commission on the Law of Estates, which recommended
that the surrogate's court be granted jurisdiction over all trusts. 18 '
This proposal was disregarded. Moreover, the Surrogate's Court
Procedure Act itself provides, in the section dealing with powers
incidental to the jurisdiction of the surrogate, that "[n]othing
herein provided shall be construed to confer jurisdiction on the court
over inter vivos trusts."' Though such language is subject to more
than one interpretation,"'8 it can readily be seen as an indication of
legislative intent to deny the surrogate such jurisdiction in all situa-
tions.
It appears, therefore, that however practical and prudent the
Fornason decision may be, it does not fully comport with the com-
mand of precedent. Hopefully, the Court of Appeals at its earliest
opportunity will reevaluate Lyon in light of subsequent constitu-
tional and statutory developments. 87 Ultimately, however, this
question can best be resolved by the legislature. It is only through
clarification of the statutory provisions concerning the jurisdiction
of the surrogate's court with respect to living trusts that the legisla-
tive purpose can be accurately divined and faithfully executed.
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK PRACTICE
Residence requirements in a matrimonial action held not to relate
to subject matter jurisdiction.
COMM'N REPoRT, supra note 164, at 512.
" N.Y. Sumi. CT. PRoc. ACr § 209(4) (McKinney 1967). It has been suggested that the
caveat contained in § 209(4) was the legislature's reaction to the Temporary Commission's
suggestion that the surrogate's court be given jurisdiction over all trusts. See In re Griffith,
176 N.Y.L.J. 11, July 16, 1976, at 9, col. 3 (Sur. Ct. Queens County). The Reviser's Notes to
the section state simply that subdivision 4, which grants the surrogate power to determine
the decedent's interest in certain property, "is not intended to confer power on the court to
settle the account of the trustee of an inter vivos trust." N.Y. Suai. CT. Poc. Acr § 209,
Reviser's Notes at 214-15 (McKinney 1967).
M8 In In re Estate of Lurje, 64 Misc. 2d 569, 315 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1970), the court stated that the last sentence of § 209(4) meant simply that nothing in that
subdivision conferred jurisdiction, and that § 201(3) did provide general jurisdiction over
decedents' affairs. See also Midonick, Do Surrogates Have Jurisdiction in Cases Involving
Living Trusts?, 173 N.Y.L.J. 115, June 16, 1975, at 19, col. 1. Professor Siegel, however,
suggests that any argument concluding that the Act's general grants of subject matter juris-
diction could be construed to include inter vivos trusts is negated by § 209(4). N.Y. SURR.
CT. PRoc. AcT § 201, commentary at 46 (McKinney 1967). In Fornason, the court interpreted
§ 209(4) "as not prohibiting jurisdiction in a case. . . where the inter vivos trust has termi-
nated and the 'affairs of a decedent' are involved." 88 Misc. 2d at 746, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 1009.
I" See note 180 supra.
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Section 230 of the DRL provides the residence requirements
necessary to maintain a matrimonial action in New York."18 Hereto-
fore, it was believed that failure to comply with these statutory
prerequisites rendered a court incompetent to adjudicate a matri-
monial action. ' Recently, however, in Lacks v. Lacks,' the Court
of Appeals held that the requirements of section 230 do not go to
subject matter jurisdiction, but rather are merely substantive ele-
ments of the cause of action. 9 '
In Lacks, the defendant-wife moved pursuant to CPLR
5015(a) (4) 192 to set aside a final judgment of divorce awarded to her
husband on the ground that the court lacked subject matter juris-
u DRL § 230 provides:
An action to annul a marriage, or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, or for
divorce or separation may be maintained only when:
1. The parties were married in the state and either party is a resident thereof
when the action is commenced and has been a resident for a continuous period of
one year immediately preceding, or
2. The parties have resided in this state as husband and wife and either party
is a resident thereof when the action is commenced and has been a resident for a
continuous period of one year immediately preceding, or
3. The cause occurred in the state and either party has been a resident thereof
for a continuous period of at least one year immediately preceding the commence-
ment of the action, or
4. The cause occurred in the state and both parties are residents thereof at
the time of the commencement of the action, or
5. Either party has been a resident of the state for a continuous period of at
least two years immediately preceding the commencement of the action.
"I See Verney v. Verney, 53 App. Div. 2d 608, 383 N.Y.S.2d 905 (2d Dep't 1976) (mem.);
Eckert v. Eckert, 34 App. Div. 2d 684, 312 N.Y.S.2d 183 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.); Cocron v.
Cocron, 84 Misc. 2d 335, 375 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1975); Gromel v. Gromel,
22 Misc. 2d 33, 197 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1959).
Before a court can render a judgment it must have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate the action. Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to entertain or adjudge
the type of question involved in a case and is not dependent upon the particular facts
presented. See Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 166, 225 N.E.2d 503,
506, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793, 798 (1967). A lack of subject matter jurisdiction renders the resulting
judgment void. See Steward v. Katcher, 283 App. Div. 50, 52, 126 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (1st
Dep't 1953). Either party can move to dismiss an action on the ground that the court does
not have subject matter jurisdiction, CPLR 3211(a)(2), or the court can take note of the lack
of competence on its own volition, 11 J. Zarr, M. EDMOND & S. SCHWARTZ, NEW YoRK CrVIL
PRACIncE § 5.04[2] (1976) [hereinafter cited as Zmrr].
190 41 N.Y.2d 71, 359 N.E.2d 384, 390 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1976), aff'g 50 App. Div. 2d 785, 378
N.Y.S.2d 61 (1st Dep't 1975) (mei.).
"' 41 N.Y.2d at 73, 359 N.E.2d at 385, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
192 CPLR 5015(a)(4) provides:
(a) On Motion. The court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party
from it upon such terms as may be just, on motion of any interested person with
such notice as the court may direct, upon the ground of:
4. lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order. ...
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diction to render the judgment. 3 Defendant's motion, made nearly
two years after her right to appeal had terminated, alleged that the
plaintiff had not been a New York resident for a full year prior to
commencement of the matrimonial action as required by DRL sec-
tion 230.111 The trial court granted the defendant's motion, but the
appellate division reversed.'95
Writing for the Court, Chief Judge Breitel first rejected the
principle relied upon by the defendant that the supreme court's
power in matrimonial actions is derived purely from statute.1 8 On
the contrary, the Chief Judge noted, "'the Supreme Court is a court
'0 41 N.Y.2d at 72, 359 N.E.2d at 385, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
"' More specifically, defendant contended that the provisions of DRL § 230(2), quoted
in note 188 supra, were not satisfied by plaintiff. 41 N.Y.2d at 72, 359 N.E.2d at 385, 390
N.Y.S.2d at 876. The parties were married in New York in 1938. The initial action, com-
menced by the husband in August 1965, was for a separation on the ground of cruelty. In June
1967, the supreme court dismissed the suit, but the appellate division reversed and ordered
a new trial. The husband, in view of recent changes in the divorce law, sought an absolute
divorce at the second trial. The divorce was granted to him in March 1970 and later affirmed
by the appellate division. Id. at 73, 359 N.E.2d at 385-86, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77. Defendant,
in her motion to vacate the judgment, argued that plaintiff had not left his Paris residence
until December 1964, and therefore could not have fulfilled the residence requirements when
the suit was commenced in August 1965. 50 App. Div. 2d at 786, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 63. Defen-
dant's motion was made pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4), quoted in note 192 supra. 41 N.Y.2d
at 72, 359 N.E.2d at 385, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
" 50 App. Div. 2d at 786, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
"16 Prior to Lacks, the Court of Appeals had often ruled that jurisdiction over matri-
monial actions was exclusively statutory in origin. See, e.g., Langerman v. Langerman, 303
N.Y. 465, 104 N.E.2d 857 (1952); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948);
Walter v. Walter, 217 N.Y. 439, 111 N.E. 1081 (1916); Stokes v. Stokes, 198 N.Y. 301, 91 N.E.
793 (1910); Walker v. Walker, 155 N.Y. 77, 49 N.E. 663 (1898); Erkenbrach v. Erkenbrach,
96 N.Y. 456 (1884).
It is submitted that the necessity of implicitly overruling this prior decisional law could
have been avoided had the Lacks Court adopted the reasoning expressed in Thrasher v.
United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 225 N.E.2d 503, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1967). There,
the Court noted that subject matter jurisdiction is the "power to adjudge concerning the
general question involved, and is not dependent upon the state of facts which may appear in
a particular case arising. . . under that general question." Id. at 166, 225 N.E.2d at 506, 278
N.Y.S.2d at 798, quoting Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 229 (1878) (emphasis added). The
Thrasher Court held that the legislature's enactment of the Insurance Law vested the su-
preme court, by virtue of article 6 of the state constitution, with competence to entertain
actions relating to insurance. The plaintiff's inability to prove service of notice only went to
his failure to establish a specific element of the insurance cause of action. Similarly, the Lacks
Court could have stated that as a result of the legislature's enactment of the Domestic
Relations Law, the supreme court has competence to adjudge the general question involved
- matrimonial status. Rather, the Lacks Court opted to advance the proposition that the
supreme court's power in matrimonial actions is not exclusively derived from statute and thus
overruled a considerable number of earlier decisions. Reflecting upon the approach taken by
the Lacks Court, one commentator has remarked: "It is breathtaking to contemplate how
insignificant the statutes have become .... " McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 177
N.Y.L.J. 68, Apr. 8, 1977, at 2, col. 4.
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of original, unlimited and unqualified jurisdiction' and 'competent
to entertain all causes of action unless its jurisdiction has been
specifically proscribed.'"97 Because section 230 does not "speci-
fically proscribe" the competence of the court to adjudicate the ac-
tion, Chief Judge Breitel concluded that the trial court in Lacks
did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to render the divorce. '
Moreover, according to the Court, the 1962 amendment to article 6
of the constitution ' expanded the supreme court's jurisdiction
to include "'any proceeding not recognized at common law.' ")200
Thus, since matrimonial actions originated in the ecclesiastical
courts and were unknown to the common law courts, °1 the supreme
court is constitutionally vested with subject matter jurisdiction in
all matrimonial actions.
Declaring that the commission by a court of an error of law or
fact in a divorce action does not deprive it of jurisdiction,'2 the
Lacks Court decried the confusion which often surrounds applica-
tion of the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. 3 The Court re-
jected as incomplete the simplistic rubric that a judgment rendered
by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is absolutely void. If
this were so, commented Chief Judge Breitel, the effectiveness of
" 41 N.Y.2d at 75, 359 N.E.2d at 387, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 878, quoting Kagen v. Kagen, 21
N.Y.2d 532, 537, 236 N.E.2d 475, 478, 289 N.Y.S.2d 195, 199 (1968), and Thrasher v. United
States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 166, 255 N.E.2d 503, 506, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793, 798 (1967).
, 41 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 359 N.E.2d at 387, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
," The constitution now provides in pertinent part:
If the legislature shall create new classes of actions and proceedings, the supreme
court shall have jurisdiction over such classes of actions and proceedings, but the
legislature may provide that another court or other courts shall also have jurisdic-
tion and that actions and proceedings of such classes may be originated in such
other court or courts.
N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 7.
41 N.Y.2d at 76, 359 N.E.2d at 388, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 879, quoting Kagen v. Kagen, 21
N.Y.2d 532, 537, 236 N.E.2d 475, 478, 289 N.Y.S.2d 195, 199 (1968).
20, N.Y. JuD. LAw § 140-b (McKinney 1968) provides:
The general jurisdiction in law and equity which the supreme court possesses under
the provisions of the constitution includes all the jurisdiction which was possessed
and exercised by the supreme court of the colony of New York at any time, and by
the court of chancery in England on the fourth day of July, seventeen hundred
seventy-six ....
In Langerman v. Langerman, 303 N.Y. 465, 104 N.E.2d 857 (1952), the Court noted that
matrimonial actions in England were disposed of exclusively in the ecclesiastical courts. It
was not until the middle of the 19th century that matrimonial causes of action were trans-
ferred to a newly created divorce court in England. Since the supreme court possessed no
subject matter jurisdiction at law or in equity over matrimonial actions, its jurisdiction over
such cases must have been exclusively statutory. 303 N.Y. at 469-70, 104 N.E.2d at 858-59.
202 41 N.Y.2d at 77, 359 N.E.2d at 388, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
20 Id. at 74, 359 N.E.2d at 386, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
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the doctrine of res judicata would be substantially impaired. The
Court noted that an assertion "that a court lacks 'jurisdiction' to
decide a case may, in reality, mean that elements of a cause of
action are absent. ... "I0Turning to an analysis of the objection
raised in the case at bar, the Lacks Court concluded that the resi-
dency requirements of DRL section 230 do not go to the competence
of the court, but rather, are merely substantive elements of the
matrimonial action.2 5 Consequently, the Court held the defendant's
present objection, raised long after the exhaustion of her final ap-
peal, barred by the doctrine of res judicata.206
Although the Lacks decision should clarify the existing confu-
sion in the area of subject matter jurisdiction, the exact holding of
the Court may run afoul of the legislature's desire to prevent New
York from becoming a "divorce mill." Since one result of Lacks is
that a party will not be able to collaterally attack a divorce judg-
ment in New York on the basis of the absence of required resi-
dence, °7 nonresidents may more freely seek the relief afforded by
New York's liberal divorce law.08
204 Id.
2G Id. at 73, 359 N.E.2d at 385, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
Id. at 77, 359 N.E.2d at 388, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 879. Subject matter jurisdiction may
always be challenged if the judgment is rendered by a court lacking the competency to
adjudicate the general question involved. See In re Estate of Rougeron, 17 N.Y.2d 264, 271,
217 N.E.2d 639, 643, 270 N.Y.S.2d 578, 583, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966). See also Taylor
Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 301 Ill. 381, 134 N.E. 169 (1922). For a general discussion of
the doctrine of res judicata, see 9 CARMODY-WAIT 2d §§ 63:196-:200, at 197-203 (1966).
"1 41 N.Y.2d at 73, 359 N.E.2d at 385, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 876. The Lacks holding may raise
problems of a constitutional dimension. When the residence issue is erroneously decided at
trial, res judicata may insulate the decree from assault only in New York. The judgment will
still be vulnerable to collateral attack in other states if the "minimal contacts with the
[forum] State under Federal constitutional standards" are not truly satisfied. Id. at 73, 359
N.E.2d at 385, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 876. The minimal contact required by the Constitution is
domicile of one of the parties in the state rendering the judgment. As the Supreme Court
stated in Williams v. North Carolina, "[tihe domicil of one spouse within a State gives power
to that State. . .to dissolve a marriage wheresoever contracted." 325 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1945).
"Domicil consists in [sic] more than mere physical presence. Two circumstances must occur:
(1) residence, and (2) intention to remain there and make it a home permanently or indefi-
nitely." Gage v. Gage, 89 F. Supp. 987, 990 (D.D.C. 1950). See generally Note, Durational
Residence Requirements From Shapiro Through Sosna: The Right to Travel Takes a New
Turn, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 622, 656-62 (1975). Should a New York divorce be granted absent
satisfaction of the domicil requirement, the decree would not be entitled to full faith and
credit in sister states. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. at 229, 238-39.
"I In the opinion of Dean McLaughlin, Lacks represents "an open invitation to nonresi-
dents to come to New York to obtain a divorce under our liberal divorce law." McLaughlin,
New York Trial Practice, 177 N.Y.L.J. 68, Apr. 8, 1977, at 2, col. 4. As a result of the
insulation which the Lacks decision provides to matrimonial judgments, the courts must now
cope with the increased possibility of collusive actions. Although the complaint in a matri-
monial action must include a statement that the parties have fulfilled the residence require-
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Regardless of the fate of DRL section 230, the extent to which
the Lacks rationale will be applied remains to be seen. The potential
ramifications of the decision are manifold. For example, Dean
McLaughlin has commented that certain provisions of section 1314
of the Business Corporation Law," 9 which restricts access to New
York courts by nonresidents seeking to sue foreign corporations,
may be analogous to the residence requirements of DRL section
230.210 If this is so, the parties' failure to satisfy one of the section
1314 criteria would not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Despite these uncertainties, the basic message of Lacks re-
mains clear: Should a litigant fail to satisfy the statutory elements
of a cause of action, his adversary must either object in a timely
fashion or be barred by the doctrine of res judicata from subse-
quently challenging the resulting judgment. Characterization of sta-
tutory requirements as jurisdictional will no longer necessarily suf-
fice as the basis for permitting a party subsequently to collaterally
attack a judgment.
ments of DRL § 230, see Bonami v. Bonami, 246 App. Div. 822, 284 N.Y.S. 796 (2d Dep't
1936) (per curiam); Taylor v. Taylor, 80 N.Y.S.2d 745 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1948), it is
evident that this requirement will not prevent nondomiciliaries from falsely establishing a
New York residence. Hence, in a collusive matrimonial action between such persons, it is
conceivable that neither spouse would move pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the
action on the ground that the residence requirements had not been fulfilled. In most instan-
ces, the court would be unaware of this collusion and would consequently grant the relief
sought by the participants. If, however, the trial judge suspected that the parties had failed
to satisfy the requisites of § 230, he could then demand further proof of residence since DRL
§ 211 requires a plaintiff to prove satisfactorily all of the grounds upon which his action is
predicated. See Zmr, supra note 189, at § 37.11. Should the evidence of collusion not come
to the court's attention until after judgment has been entered, the decree issued should be
set aside. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 9 Misc. 252, 30 N.Y.S. 200 (Super. Ct. N.Y.C. 1894).
10 Section 1314 of the Business Corporation Law provides in pertinent part:
(b) . . . an action or special proceeding against a foreign corporation may be
commenced by another foreign corporation. . . or by a non-resident in the follow-
ing cases only:
(1) Where it is brought to recover damages for the breach of a contract made
or to be performed within this state, or relating to property situated within this
state at the time of the making of the contract.
(2) Where the subject matter of the litigation is situated within this state.
(3) Where the cause of action arose within this state, except where the object
of the action or special proceeding is to affect the title of real property situated
outside this state.
(4) Where, in any case not included in the preceding subparagraphs, a non-
domiciliary would be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of this state
under section 302 of the civil practice law and rules.
(5) Where the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business or authorized
to do business in this state.
N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 1314 (McKinney 1963).
210 See McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 177 N.Y.L.J. 68, Apr. 8, 1977, at 2, col. 2.
